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Equal Protection-De Facto Racio-Economic Classifica-
tions Not Constitutionally Suspect
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth amendment's prohibition that "no state shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the lawsI has
long been held to require not only that each person be afforded a "fair"
administration of state statutory commands, but also that the laws
themselves be "equal."'2 This requirement of equal laws, however, has
not been interpreted to mean that statutes must apply uniformly to all
persons; 3 rather the courts have held that legislatures may fashion laws
that affect separate classes of persons unequally,4 as long as the classifi-
cations involved are reasonable.5 While this judicial standard of reasona-
bleness recognizes that differences in fact may properly be reflected by
differences in law, it requires similar treatment for those who are simi-
larly situated with respect to the purpose of the legislative enactment. 6
Since classifications calculated to advance only constitutionally unac-
ceptable objectives are not "reasonable," 7 the traditional judicial test for
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 342
(1949); see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
3. "The fourteenth amendment . . . does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate." Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1887).
4. "It is of the essence of classification, that upon the class are cast duties and burdens
different from those resting on the general public. . . . [T]he very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality." Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899).
5. Id. at 104-05; see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at 344.
6. Since equal treatment of subjects different in fact is no more reasonable than different
treatment of subjects equal in fact, it follows that laws may not impose sanctions without regard
to the factual situations of those they reach. Moreover, it is not enough that the statutory sanctions
fall equally upon all in the class defined by the enactment. This point was emphatically made in
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964), when the Court rejected as unconstitutional a
statute outlawing cohabitation between two persons of different sex and race despite the State's
contention that since punishment was meted out to both parties regardless of race there was no
improper classification. See Huang-Thio, Equal Protection and Rational Classification, 1963 J.
PUB. L. 412, 418-22; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at 345; Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969).
7. When the purpose reasonably advanced by a legislative classification violates a constitu-
tiorlal provision, it would seem that the classification should be held constitutionally infirm as
violating that provision. For an article suggesting that some leading equal protection decisions
might have been better decided on other grounds see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1959). The result, however, is the same under
traditional equal protection analysis; when the purpose reasonably advanced is disregarded as
impermissible, the classification is by definition no longer reasonable, hence constitutionally infirm.
See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 1081.
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determining whether state legislative action' violates the equal protection
clause is whether the action that treats some persons differently from
others bears a reasonable relation to a permissible state purpose.? Under
this test, the party challenging the state action carries the burden of
showing that the classification in question is not reasonably related to
the advancement of a legitimate state interest, 0 and the state is aided by
a presumption of constitutionality." Under some circumstances, courts
have applied a much less permissive standard of review to challenged
classifications, subjecting them to "strict scrutiny,' 2 under which the
normal presumption of constitutionality loses its efficacy. 3 In cases
involving classifications that the court has found to be inherently "sus-
pect,"" or when the state's purpose in making some classification has
affected "fundamental interests,"'15 or when elements of both "suspi-
8. The fourteenth amendment's prohibition is directed against the states. This Comment will
not explore the law as it relates to the requirement of "state action" in equal protection cases,
except to note that the area is not free from controversy. See generally Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957);
Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV.
3 (1961).
9. See Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1909). "[A classification] must be based upon
some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect
to which such classification is imposed ... ." Id. at 417. Another common formulation is that a
classification is reasonable, hence valid, when it "includes all persons who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law." Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at 346.
10. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (plaintiffs sustained burden of demonstrat-
ing that exemption of only the American Express Company from statutory requirement of licensing
was unreasonable classification); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (one
assailing classification must show that it is essentially arbitrary).
11. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (exemptions in Sunday
closing law held reasonable; despite fact of some inequality in practice, state legislature was pre-
sumed to have acted within constitutional power in passing measure).
12. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny").
13. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 110 1; see Sei Fujii v. State,
38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (California court viewed cases as negating the normal presump-
tion of constitutionality when strict scrutiny was applied in holding California alien land law
violative of equal protection); cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Virginia antimiscege-
nation statute held to violate equal protection).
14. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (exclusion of Japanese-
Americans from West Coast military area during World War 11).
15. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (statute provid-
ing for sterilization of habitual criminals held unconstitutional; procreation viewed as one of the
"basic civil rights of man").
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cion" and infringement of "fundamental interests" have been found,"
the "strict scrutiny" test has been applied to charge the state with the
burden of establishing that the unequal treatment is necessary1 7 to
achieve an "overriding"' 8 state goal. Although the Court has not estab-
lished any clear standard for the identification of suspect classifications,
those based on race have long been viewed with disfavor, 9 and those
based on nationality 2 and lineage2' have received similar treatment.
Classifications made explicitly on the basis of wealth may be suspect,
22
but no Supreme Court decision has held that a wealth classification
alone will trigger a strict standard of review.'3 When classifications have
infringed individual interests of franchise, 24 criminal process,'2 procrea-
16. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia poll tax viewed
as a suspect wealth classification infringing upon the fundamental interest of exercising the fran-
chise).
17. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (suspect classifications must be shown to be
"necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective").
18. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("Our inquiry, therefore, is whether
there clearly appears in the relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose .... ").
19. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Some commentators have sug-
gested that race is "constitutionally irrelevant," and that any classification based on race is there-
fore a per se violation of equal protection. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra
note 6, at 1088.
20. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (California law prohibiting
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to aliens held violative of equal protection).
21. See Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (California alien land law
held to violate equal protection).
22. "The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminat-
ing between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the formulation and application of their laws." Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
23. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court struck down de facto wealth classifications that infringed upon
"fundamental interests" in voting and the criminal process. While the Court's language in both
cases indicates that the wealth classifications involved would have been independently sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny, the infringement of fundamental interests provides an alternate ground.
Furthermore, in view of the multitude of heretofore unquestioned de facto wealth classifica-
tions-for example, conditioning the right to ride a municipal bus on the payment of a 350
fare-and their importance in the functioning of modern government-presumably, progressive
income taxes are de facto wealth classifications-it is perhaps premature to take the Court's
language literally. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying traditional test to a
denial of AFDC payments for "excess" dependent children of otherwise qualified indigent moth-
ers); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (applying traditional test to invalidate requirement that
school board members be property owners).
24. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection clause requires state
legislative seats to be apportioned on the basis of population). But cf. McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (state action denying incarcerated persons absentee ballots
does not trigger strict scrutiny).
25. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent criminal defendants entitled to free
trial transcripts).
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tion,26 interstate travel' 2 and, perhaps, education, 28 the Court has consid-
ered these "fundamental" and has applied strict judicial scrutiny;29 when
defacto, or nonexplicit,30 wealth classifications have been found to in-
fringe any of these interests' the same result has followed.
This discussion will focus on the criteria used by the Court in
deciding whether to impose the strict scrutiny standard of review in the
area of interrelated de facto wealth and racial classifications. In applying
its criteria, the Court has looked beyond the superficially innocuous
provisions of apparently universal3 2 or neutral33 statutes to determine
whether the law would result in unequal effects on the basis of wealth
or race sufficient to "trigger ' 3 strict scrutiny. Although case law thus
far has not disclosed how direct or significant the racial or economic
impact of such a statute must be to merit strict scrutiny, the Court must
apply some limiting standard, since almost any legislative measure con-
tains the probability of unequal racial or economic effects. 5 The diffi-
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Oklahoma statute provid-
ing for sterilization of habitual offenders stricken).
27. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirement for public wel-
fare held impermissible).
28. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Although the Court has spoken of the franchise as "preservative of other basic civil and
political rights," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), and of procreation as a "right which
is basic to the perpetuation of a race," Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
536 (1942), there has been no delineation of more specific criteria to distinguish those interests that
have been deemed "fundamental" from those interests of apparently similar nature that have not.
30. In the remainder of this discussion, legislative acts which "classify," that is, impose
burdens and/or benefits without explicitly describing those persons who are to be affected, will be
said to impose de facto classifications, as distinguished from explicit classifications. There is no
intention to inject any content as to the legitimacy of the classification.
31. A case can be made that all the decisions involving "fundamental interests" also involved
wealth classifications. See Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 343, 346 (1971).
32. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (California constitutional amendment
providing that property owners were free to sell or refuse to sell to anyone held to involve the State
in impermissible authorization and encouragement of private discrimination).
33. E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (state action in closing public
schools ostensibly affected children of both races equally but effect was to deny black children the
opportunity to attend integrated schools).
34. See cases cited notes 32 & 33 supra. The term "trigger" is taken from Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
35. As long as individuals are not in fact precisely equal in their economic and/or racial
characteristics, any legislative measure can be found to have unequal racial or economic effects.
For example, a law that requires all persons to pay a 35¢ bus fare imposes a heavier burden on the
poor than on the rich because the poor depend heavily on public systems for transportation, and
because fare payment is much less of a relative hardship on the affluent than on the needy. Since
"the poor" consist in disproportionate part of racial minorities, see U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, No. 54: THE EXTENT OF POV-
1972]
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culty of isolating the relevant factors used in ascertaining the applicabil-
ity of "strict scrutiny" is compounded by the Court's failure to disclose
whether legislative motive is relevant as an independent criterion in as-
sessing the "suspect" nature of de facto classifications."
Two recent cases presented the Supreme Court with factual situa-
tions involving these questions of classification. In James v. Valtierra3 1
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, failed to find a suspect
classification of an either racial or economic nature in the California
constitution's requirement that local housing authority decisions to initi-
ate federally financed low-income housing projects be subjected to voter
approval. In Palmer v. Thompson, 8 the Court, again speaking through
Mr. Justice Black, refused to find any classification at all when the
mayor and city council of Jackson, Mississippi, decided to close all
municipal swimming pools in the wake of a federal court judgment that
the pools' segregated operation was unconstitutional. In both cases, the
Court's failure to find suspect classifications and thereby impose strict
scrutiny seems to indicate a significant abatement of its recent active
concern in the areas of civil rights and poverty.
ERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1959-1966, at 3-4 (1968), such a requirement also would impose
heavier burdens on the basis of race. It is hardly conceivable that this example presents a proper
situation for the imposition of strict scrutiny, yet some degree of economic and racial classification
is present. The question that this Comment seeks to examine is "how much" and "what sort" of
racio-economic effect state action must generate before the state will have created a "suspect
classification."
36. The Court traditionally has been reluctant to inquire into legislative motive. See United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (refusal to void draft-card burning statute on basis
that the congressional motive for enactment was suppression of freedom of speech); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48, 73 (1810) (refusal to void Georgia legislature's sale of land on theory
that legislators were corruptly motivated). Yet some equal protection cases indicate that legislative
motive provided a basis for the resulting determination of unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Hall v. St.
Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affdpercuriam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962)
(superficially innocuous statute with impermissible "sub-surface purpose"); Bush v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (acts with
"sole purpose" of continuing segregation); cf Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra
note 6, at 1092-1101. For a discussion of the distinction between the legislative "purpose" used in
both traditional and "strict scrutiny" equal protection analysis, and legislative "motive," not used
in the traditional analysis and of controversial applicability under the strict standard see Note,
Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adjudication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887 (1970).
37. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Mr. Justice Black spoke for a majority of 5. Mr. Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
38. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). Justice Black again wrote the majority opinion and was joined by
4 other justices. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined in the opinion of the Court,
but filed brief concurring opinions. Mr. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, who also filed brief separate dissents. Mr. Justice Douglas filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
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II. PALMER V. THOMPSON
In Palmer, petitioners, black residents of Jackson, urged that res-
pondent's action in closing the municipal pools was unconstitutional
because it was racially motivated and resulted in constitutionally suspect
racial classification under at least four theories:39 (1) that the closings
in fact affected Negroes more harshly than whites because whites still
had access to private segregated pools while Negroes did not, just as the
whites in Griffin v. County School Board0 had access to private segre-
gated schools while Negroes did not; (2) that the city was authorizing
and encouraging private discrimination, as condemned in Reitman v.
Mulkey;4" (3) that the city's response of closing the pools after petition-
ers had attempted to secure equal access to public facilities marked an
unconstitutional "chilling"4 2 of the black community's right to chal-
lenge segregation under the civil rights statutes43 by establishing an im-
permissible inference that future protests against segregation in public
facilities would be met by closing those facilities; and (4) that under
Hunter v. Erickson" the "impact" of the city's superficially neutral act
fell on the racial minority as the enunciation of an official view that
Negroes are not fit to share with whites this particular type of public
facility.45 The Court rejected petitioners' reliance on any cases other than
Reitman or Griffin as implausible, and then distinguished those two as
39. Petitioners also maintained that the pool closings were a denial of the right of Negroes
to swim in public pools with whites, and as such, constituted a "badge or incident of slavery" in
violation of the thirteenth amendment under Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
40. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Griffin, the public schools of Prince Edward County, Virginia,
were closed, but public aid was extended to private academies, which were in fact all white.
41. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see note 32 supra.
42. The "chilling effect" theory relied upon is expressed in United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570. 581 (1968), and Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965). See Note, supra
note 36, at 1901-02.
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964), provides: "All persons .. .
shall have the same right . . . to sue . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. ... The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 further provides that the Attorney General may bring a civil suit in the name of the
United States upon receipt of a signed complaint from a private person that he is being denied equal
use of any public facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-b (1964).
44. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In addition to finding an explicit racial classification in Akron's
city charter amendment to prevent the implementation of open housing ordinances unless approved
by referendum, the Court stated: "[A]Ithough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and
gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Id. at
391.
45. This expression of the fourth theory is taken from Mr. Justice White's dissent, 403 U.S.
at 266-68. The "impact" referred to is the psychological impact of officially sanctioned views of
racial inferiority as recognized and condemned in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491-94
(1954).
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resting on findings that the state had participated actively in the perpe-
tuation of segregated school facilities4" or had officially encouraged pri-
vate discrimination, 4 while the Palmer record disclosed no evidence in
support of any similar state involvement. Pointing out elements of diffi-
culty, futility, and impropriety inherent in judicial attempts to divine
legislative motive, 48 the Court ruled out motivation analysis as an inde-
pendent equal protection test, explaining that, although some previous
decisions49 contain language indicating that legislative motive might be
relevant to constitutionality, the "focus" in those cases was on the
actual effect of the challenged enactments. Turning to the actual effect
of the pool closings, the Court found that the record disclosed only that
Jackson once operated segregated swimming pools and now operates no
pools at all. Then, by reasoning that all residents are equally barred from
using the closed facilities, the Court concluded that no equal protection
violation had occurred. In holding that no unequal treatment could be
found from the record, the Court necessarily foreclosed petitioners' at-
tempts to demonstrate de facto racial classification, since a finding of
such a classification would require unequal treatment. Although some
degree of unequal treatment must clearly have resulted from the city's
action,"1 the Court did not consider taking judicial notice of external
46. See note 40 supra.
47. In Reitman, the Court relied heavily on the California Supreme Court's finding of
significant state involvement in the discriminatory acts of private parties. See Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39.
48. The Court noted that "[i]t is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 'sole'
or 'dominant' motivation behind the choices of a group of legislators." 403 U.S. at 225. The Court
also pointed out that a law struck down because of the bad motives of its supporters presumably
would be valid when passed again for "different reasons." Id. The Court cited Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48, 73 (1810) (refusal to void legislative land sale on theory that legislators
were corruptly motivated), as expressing the "pitfalls" of motivation analysis.
49. The Court specifically referred to the opinions in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), both of which previously had been
thought to stand for the proposition that motivation analysis could be determinative of constitution-
ality. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
50. Given the Court's premise, that the only effect of the pool closings was to bar blacks
and whites equally, the conclusion-no equal protection violation-is inescapable. Equal protection
analysis, under either the traditional test or the strict scrutiny standard, is framed in terms of
classification. Since, in Palmer, there is no explicit classification and no unequal effects are found,
there is no classification, and therefore no equal protection issue. Put another way, equal protection
can hardly be violated when equal treatment is given.
51. The fact that poor people do not have the same access to personal or private swimming
pools as do rich people, together with the fact that a disproportionate number of the poor are
members of racial minorities, demonstrates that unequal racial effects stemmed from respondent's
action.
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facts to remedy any deficiency in the formal proof,5 2 but confined its
analysis to the record before it.
III. JAMES V. VALTIERRA
In James v. Valtierra,53 plaintiffs, who were qualified applicants for
public housing, secured a federal district court judgment 54 that article 34
of the California constitution, requiring referendum approval of low-
income housing projects,5 5 violated the equal protection clause by mak-
ing it more difficult for federal agencies to provide housing assistance
than other forms of statutorily authorized assistance, thereby imposing
a "special burden" on the poor and on racial minorities. 51 On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed, finding the challenged referendum provi-
sion constitutionally permissible. The authority supporting plaintiffs'
argument that article 34 classified on the basis of race was distinguished
as applying only to explicit classifications; 57 the wording of the impugned
referendum provision, however, disclosed no racial content and the re-
cord was viewed as providing no support for any claim that the overtly
52. Judicial notice would have been proper to find these effects under either the traditional
practice of courts to take notice of commonly known facts, or, under the broad latitude afforded
the judiciary in determining the constitutionality of legislative action, to take notice of any "legisla-
tive" facts which bear upon the issue. See notes 70 & 72 infra and accompanying text. For an
example of the use of legislative judicial notice to furnish data for use in the decision of a constitu-
tional issue see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
54. Valtierra v. Housing Authority, 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970). The case is a consolida-
tion of 2 actions and was so tried by the 3-judge district court.
55. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § I provides: "No low rent housing project shall hereafter
be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body, until a majority of
the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to
develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in
favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or special election.
"For the purposes of this article only, 'persons of low income' shall mean persons or families
who lack the amount of income necessary (as determined by the state public body developing,
constructing, or acquiring the housing project) to enable them without financial assistance, to live
in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding. ... The provision was adopted in
1950 in response to a California Supreme Court decision, Housing Authority v. Superior Court,
35 Cal. 2d 550, 219 P.2d 457 (1950), which held that local housing authority decisions to seek
federal aid for housing projects were "administrative" rather than "legislative" in nature and
therefore outside California's general referendum provision, CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which
reserves to the people the power to adopt or reject any act passed by the legislature.
56. The decision was held to be controlled by Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The
opinion of the 3-judge court stated: "Here, as in the Hunter case, the 'special burden' of a referen-
dum is not ordinarily required; here as in the Hunter case, the impact of the law falls upon
minorities." 313 F. Supp. at 5.
57. 402 U.S. at 141. The Court said that the Hunter rationale would apply only if the
referendum requirement contained an explicit classification.
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neutral provision was "in fact aimed at a racial minority.""8 The Court
apparently conceded that article 34 resulted in unequal treatment by
disadvantaging persons seeking affirmative public housing decisions
with respect to persons seeking to influence other public decisions, but
did not discuss plaintiffs' position that this effect amounted to a suspect
wealth classification. 9 It would seem, however, that for a court to find
a de facto wealth classification should require no more than drawing the
clearly available inference that those who seek low-income housing pro-
jects are probably "poor." 6 The Court's silence on this point appears
to support its previous refusal to find a racial classification, since plain-
tiffs' argument that racial minorities were disadvantaged appears to
depend on an inference that the poor consist largely of these minorities,
which in turn depends on the inference that those who seek low-income
housing are poor.61 The Court also was silent on the possibility that
article 34's referendum requirement infringed a fundamental interest in
"housing, 81 2 foreclosing the imposition of strict scrutiny on that
ground. Reasoning that every referendum requirement disadvantages a
group that favors the subject of the referendum, and that the California
constitution contains several examples of mandatory referenda63 on is-
sues of public importance, the Court refused to declare that referenda
automatically result in equal protection violations. The Court consid-
ered that since low-income housing projects impose long-term fiscal
liabilities on the communities in which they are situated,64 the challenged
58. Id.
59. On this point, Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting, stated: "The article explicitly singles out
low-income persons to bear its burden," and therefore found a "[s]uspect classification, which
demands exacting judicial scrutiny." 402 U.S. at 144, 145.
60. Had the Court found a de facto wealth classification, it would then have been confronted
with the question of whether that classification was constitutionally suspect. Since the Court did
not draw the inference necessary to find a de facto classification, it avoided the necessity of
considering whether such a classification should trigger the strict scrutiny test.
61. See note 35 supra.
62. Although the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of housing in previous
decisions, it has not taken the occasion to denominate housing a fundamental interest. See Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). For an argument that
housing is a fundamental interest for the purposes of equal protection analysis see Note, supra note
31, at 347-48.
63. The Court referred to provisions requiring mandatory referenda for approval of constitu-
tional amendments, CAL. CO NST. art. XVIII, for the issuance of long-term local bonds, CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, and for certain municipal territorial annexations, CAL. CONST. art. X1. Addition-
ally, the Court observed that much of California's statutory law was first enacted by referendum
and therefore can be repealed or amended only by referendum. CAL. CONST. art. IV.
64. Although the housing projects in question are financed through the federal government,
local communities must waive all taxes on the property while furnishing all municipal services. The
[Vol. 25
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referendum requirement has the purpose of placing decisions that so
affect the community in the hands of the people who ultimately must
bear the costs that they entail. In concluding that this allocation of
decision-making power did not violate the equal protection clause, the
Court's opinion appears to follow traditional equal protection analysis.
Finding a classification consisting of those desiring low-income public
housing, and a permissible state purpose of placing long-term commun-
ity liability decisions in the hands of the community, the Court con-
cluded that the classification was reasonably related to the purpose of
the state action.
6 5
IV. INTERACTION OF JAMES AND PALMER
Since it is based on traditional equal protection analysis, the James
decision leaves open several questions. It is not clear whether the Court
rejected de facto wealth classifications as constitutionally suspect or
whether the Court's action was meant to hold that de facto racial classi-
fications found by inference from unequal economic treatment are con-
stitutionally irrelevant; further, it is also not certain that housing was
rejected as a "fundamental interest," since the Court's silence on these
points is susceptible to a variety of interpretations." Similarly, the
Palmer opinion, by disposing of the case on "no-classification"
grounds, avoided the questions whether economic effects alone may trig-
ger strict scrutiny and whether economic effects may support an infer-
ence of suspect racial classification.
These decisions 'leave the precise nature of the constitutional stan-
dards applicable to de facto legislative classifications in doubt. Although
the majority in Palmer was apparently sound in its rejection of motiva-
tion analysis as an independent equal protection test,67 an application of
cost to the community, however, is offset by the municipality's right to 10% of the rentals; but by
definition these rentals are artificially low. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1964), as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (Supp. V, 1970).
65. This rationale, however, seems vulnerable to the attack that the classification is "under-
inclusive" in that all long-term liability decisions are not subject to the mandatory referendum
requirement. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 2, at 348-51. In identifying other decisions
subject to mandatory referenda the Court does not answer this contention, although it does lessen
the appearance of arbitrary selection. One possible answer to the charge of under-inclusion is the
rationale that legislatures are not compelled to reach all persons similarly situated or else not
legislate at all; the Court has often held that legislatures are free to attack one part of a problem
at a time. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
66. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
67. Since, in Palmer, the Court found that the state action did not classify at all on the basis
of race, the motive behind its action could not have been logically relevant to the equal protection
question. The equal protection clause can hardly operate to condemn as discriminatory action
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the test ostensibly adopted in that case as the proper standard-the
"actual effect"61 8 of the challenged action-to the factual situations pre-
sented by both Palmer and James seems to lead to results inconsistent
with the conclusions reached by the Court. Unequal economic effects
caused by state action are directly traceable in both cases. In James, the
constitutional provision in question concededly "disadvantaged" those
seeking low-income housing, hence those with low incomes. In Palmer,
the closing of public swimming pools necessarily had a greater effect
upon those with low incomes who have no access to personal or private
pools.69 Although by taking judicial notice of indisputable matter of
common knowledge, 70 the Court could have found each of these effects
from the overtly neutral state action at issue, in neither case did the
Court expressly find a wealth classification. This apparent inconsistency
between the Court's language and the results it reached suggests three
interpretations: First, it is possible that the Court's failure to impose
strict scrutiny on the James and Palmer facts constitutes an implied
which does not in fact single out any individual person or group to bear special burdens-to find a
denial of equal protection when equal treatment has been given involves a contradiction in terms.
Cf. note 50 supra. To say that motivation analysis is unacceptable as an independent test of equal
protection violation, however, is not to say that legislative motive should not play a part in equal
protection analysis. Since almost any conceivable legislative action ultimately may be shown to
result in unequal effects on the basis of race or wealth, see note 35 supra, it is clear that some cut-
off point is needed, if only to avoid the conclusion that the majority of our statutes violate the
fourteenth amendment. For an argument that motivation analysis should be used to fill that need
see Ely, supra note 34.
68. In rejecting motivation analysis as an equal protection test in Palmer, Mr. Justice Black
pointed out that the "focus" in those cases which had been relied upon as precedent for the
relevance of legislative motive was on the actual effect of the challenged enactments. Justice Black
then proceeded to examine the actual effect of the state action in Palmer itself. The opinion therefore
supports the conclusion that the Court adopted an actual effect test for the presence of suspect
classifications.
69. Although the majority in Palmer did not discuss the economic classification issue at all,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision upholding the pool closings, noted the plaintiffs'
argument that the greater access of the more affluent white community to swimming pools resulted
in racial classification, but disposed of it as follows: "The equal protection clause does not promise
or guarantee economic or financial equality. . .. [T]his Court cannot require a city to operate a
public swimming pool solely because the city's ceasing to do so forecloses the enjoyment by
financially less fortunate citizens of recreational facilities available on a completely private basis
to the more affluent." Palmer v. Thompson, 419 F.2d 1222, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
70. "The oldest and plainest ground for judicial notice is that the fact is so commonly known
in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known as to make
it indisputable among reasonable men." C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 324, at 689 (1954). The fact
that those who desire low-income housing are likely to be poor, or that access to personal or private
swimming pools is likely to be a function of wealth is undoubtedly both commonly and certainly
known in Mississippi and California.
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rejection of wealth as an independently suspect trait.71 Secondly, in both
cases the emphasis the Court placed on the actual content of the record
indicates that the decisions may be explicable in terms of the combina-
tion of a failure of the respective records to include sufficient direct proof
of unequal economic effects and of the Court's reluctance to utilize
judicial notice to remedy the omission. Thirdly, the apparent inconsis-
tency is perhaps best explained by the possibility that the Court simply
felt that the unequal economic effects stemming from the questioned
state action were not "sufficient" to be termed suspect classifications,
thereby reserving the question whether economic effects alone could ever
trigger strict scrutiny. These three interpretations are relevant in consid-
ering the Court's failure to find a racial classification in either case,
despite the fact that as a practical matter unequal economic treatment
seems to be the equivalent of unequal treatment on the basis of race.72
If the records themselves were thought insufficient to establish unequal
treatment on the basis of wealth, then the inference of unequal racial
effect could not have arisen. If the unequal economic effects were recog-
nized, but considered insufficient to create a suspect wealth classifica-
tion, then the inference of racial classification would remain. This would
be, however, a "second order" inference, in the sense that an inference
of unequal economic effect must first be drawn from the superficially
neutral state action before the "racial" inference is available. From this
viewpoint, James and Palmer may be read as announcing a rule that
unequal racial effects found by second order inferences are not sufficient
to create suspect classifications.73
71. Cf. note 69 supra.
72. The conclusion that wealth classifications are the equivalent of race classifications de-
pends upon acceptance of the premise that the poor consist in disproportionate part of racial
minorities. See note 35 supra. This proposition would seem to be amenable to judicial notice under
the traditional head of common knowledge. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, at 689. If not,
there is precedent to sustain the use of judicial notice to recognize statistical and scientific matter
when it is relevant to the constitutionality of impugned legislative acts. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (use of "legislative" judicial notice of psychological effects of
segregated schooling); PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES rule 201(a), Advisory Committee's note (a); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 70, § 323,
at 687-88.
73. Given that there are unequal economic and racial effects in Palmer and James, there are
4 possible explanations for the Court's failure to find suspect classifications: (1) rejection of wealth
as an independently suspect trait, coupled with rejection of "second-order" racial classifications;
(2) rejection of wealth as a suspect classification, together with refusal to supplement an inadequate
record with judicial notice; (3) a finding of "insufficient" economic effect, with a rejection of
"second order" racial effects; and (4) a finding of insufficient economic effect, coupled with refusal
to judicially notice the concommitant racial effect. The remaining mathematical possibilities have
neen rejected as highly unlikely.
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V. CONCLUSION
Whatever explanation accounts for the failure of the actual results
in James and Palmer to trigger strict scrutiny, the cases indicate a desire
on the part of the Court to avoid following an objectively identifiable
test for recognizing situations that call for the strict standard of review.
This approach is open to criticism on at least three grounds. First, the
Court's failure to indicate the precise standards by which it rejected the
presence of suspect classifications at best leaves the law in a condition
of uncertainty. This may be productive of future litigation over the same
ground and it may further erode public confidence in the Court as an
institution for the application of neutral and objectively identifiable prin-
ciples in the resolution of controversies, thereby weakening a real source
of its power.74 Secondly, if moral leadership is viewed as a legitimate
judicial function, then the Palmer and James decisions can be said to
reflect an unfortunate departure from the Court's previous protective
concern for minorities and the poor.7" These two cases can be read to
allow the very sort of "ingenious" discrimination that the Court fre-
quently has condemned. 76 If racial classification is not constitutionally
suspect when it springs from the economic effects of superficially neutral
state action, then subtly contrived legislation may be used to advance
discriminatory goals, as long as a legitimate purpose is also reasonably
served by the economic classifications. Thirdly, regardless of the sub-
stantive result of these decisions, the Court may be criticized for failing
to deal with the real issues presented. It seems clear that the Court
strained to avoid imposing a strict standard of review in the two cases.
77
74. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY 115-17 (2d ed. 1969); C. BLACK, The Supreme
Court and Democracy, in THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE 61 (1963); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT
21-23 (1968). Professor Cox has stated: "[Albility to rationalize a constitutional judgment in terms
of principles referable to accepted sources of law is an essential, major element of constitutional
adjudication. It is one of the ultimate sources of power for the Court .. " Cox, The Supreme
Court 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. RaV. 91 (1966).
75. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (1 year residency requirement for
welfare benefits deprives newly arrived indigents of equal protection); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969) (city charter amendment requiring general or special election to approve fair-housing
ordinances discriminates against racial minorities). But see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970) (ceiling on aid to dependent children regardless of need held a matter of social and economic
policy not subject to strict scrutiny).
76. E.g., Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940) (systematic exclusion of Negroes from
grand juries violates equal protection).
77. The distinctions relied on by the Court to reject plaintiffs' arguments do not appear
compelling. Although it is true that Palmer did not involve the state participation in the operation
of segregated facilities as found in Griffin, it is difficult not to credit Mr. Justice White's observa-
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Yet only by imposing this standard could the Court reach the real ques-
tion that the plaintiffs in both cases sought to have answered: whether,
in view of the effects it produced, the state action in each case was
justifiable. Under the traditional equal protection test, the constitution-
ality of challenged action is measured by reasonableness rather than by
justification-the relative importance of the state's goal and the means
of achieving it versus the undesirability of imposing particular unequal
burdens on the basis of wealth and/or race. By avoiding the imposition
of strict scrutiny through its failure to find suspect classifications, the
Court evaded the balancing of interests question that constituted the real
issue in each case.
78
Nevertheless, the Court's reluctance to engage in this balancing of
the state interest on the one hand, and the "relative invidiousness '79 of
the impugned classification on the other, is not without substantial sup-
port in considerations of policy. First, a Court decision applying strict
scrutiny would have been necessarily subjective in nature. Although any
legislative state action is necessarily the product of subjective value as-
signments by the legislature about the relative importance of the conflict-
ing interests involved in the original decision to enact or kill the measure,
judicial review of such acts under the equal protection clause is normally
determined objectively-by the reasonable classification test, or by a
finding that the purpose reasonably advanced by the act contravenes an
express or implied constitutional prohibition.8" Under the standard of
strict scrutiny, the Court is required to evaluate the importance of the
objective sought to be achieved by the legislation. This, however, is
presumably what the legislature has already done; indeed, this evaluation
might be said to be the legislature's primary function. Therefore, the
balancing process required by strict judicial scrutiny has undesirable
aspects because of potential erosion of judicial authority inherent in
tion that Griffin "is perhaps distinguishable, but only if one ignores its basic rationale and the
purpose and direction of this Court's decisions since Brown." 402 U.S. at 263-64 (White, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, although the majority in Hunter found an explicit racial classification in the
city charter amendment, it also emphasized the amendment's impact in creating a roadblock in
the path of minorities seeking favorable legislation. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
78. This criticism of the Court's approach is not answered by reference to the Court's
traditional avoidance of constitutional questions when other grounds are available, since the Court's
disposition of both James and Palmer was on constitutional, albeit more restrained, grounds.
79. Professor Cox views the process of strict scrutiny as follows: "The decisions appear to
rest upon two largely subjective judgments, perhaps coupled with a sense of how fast a change the
community desires. One element is the relative invidiousness of the particular differentation ....
Cox, supra note 74, at 95.
80. See note 7 supra.
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invalidating legislative action on the basis of subjective value judgmentsl
and because of possible encroachment on the legislative function in vio-
lation of the principle of separation of powers. The legislative actions
reviewed in James and Palmer appear particularly susceptible to these
undesirable consequences. A decision adverse to the state in James would
have put the Court in a position of deciding that an allocation of local
decision-making power to the local citizenry was subject to judicial
revision; a similar decision in Palmer would have been in effect a judicial
statement that the decision whether a municipality will provide its citi-
zens with a given recreational service is to be made by the courts. Viewed
from this perspective, it seems clear that these decisions are in large
measure political, and therefore of a kind ordinarily reserved to the
political branches. When, as in these cases, the subjective judgments
called for by the imposition of strict scrutiny are to be applied to ques-
tions normally associated with the functions of other branches of govern-
ment, this imposition appears to be particularly vulnerable to a charge
that the Court is abandoning the traditional judicial role to indulge in
what numerous opinions have condemned as a substitution of the
Court's judgment for that of the legislature.82 There are indications in
both Palmer" and James" that considerations of the proper role of the
judiciary influenced the decisions. These considerations provide a plausi-
ble explanation for the otherwise anomalous failure of the Court to find
suspect classifications from the racio-economic effects of the state action
in the instant decisions and at least suggest the possible emergence of a
significant doctrinal alteration in the area of equal protection. The deci-
sions may indicate that rather than relying on criteria extracted from the
actual effects of challenged state action to determine the presence of de
facto suspect classifications, the Court is in fact looking to considera-
81. "[P]olitical perceptions without roots in objective standards are an inadequate basis for
law, and to accept them would give judges unacceptably dangerous power." Cox, supra note 74,
at 98-99; see materials cited note 74 supra and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 475 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In
applying the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fastidiously careful to observe the admonition
of Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice Cardozo that we do not 'sit as a super-
legislature' ").
83. In the closing words of his Palmer opinion, Mr. Justice Black observed: "Probably few
persons, prior to this case, would have imagined that cities could be forced by five lifetime judges
to construct or refurbish swimming pools which they choose not to operate for any reason, sound
or unsound." 403 U.S. at 227.
84. In James, the Court's emphasis on provisions for referenda as provisions for democratic
decision-making suggests that court decisions striking referendum provisions as unconstitutional
would be, in the view of the Court, an interference with the democratic process.
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tions of policy for the critical determinants. The Court, in these two
cases, has taken a step toward the articulation of a position that alleg-
edly suspect de facto classifications will not receive strict judicial scru-
tiny unless the Court makes an initial determination that the considera-
tions which militate against engaging in subjective value assignment are
outweighed by the desirability of judicial action, in view of the relative
political content of the ultimate questions involved. This position would
appear to provide a theoretical potential for maximizing the effectiveness
of the Court's moral leadership role, while maintaining the Court's
ability to avoid the risk of controversy over its role in government. If
the Court avoids subjective judgments in politically sensitive areas only
when the net effect of these decisions seems likely to diminish the Court's
prestige and authority, thereby inhibiting its capacity to make future
decisions that involve subjective balancing, two results would seem to
follow. First, over the long run, the Court's function of moral leadership
will have been exercised to the fullest possible extent, since by avoiding
strict scrutiny in one case, the capability to impose that scrutiny effec-
tively in all future cases is preserved. Conversely, by avoiding controver-
sial subjective judgments, the Court will receive those benefits of in-
creased stature and prestige thought to flow from adherence to a philoso-
phy of judicial restraint. The realization of this potential, however, is
dependent upon an accurate determination at each case's inception of
the reaction of the other branches of government and the public to the
imposition of strict judicial scrutiny. This forecast, if not conjectural,
surely calls for the application of uncommon wisdom. Even if the Court
is in fact able to apply such wisdom in the majority of cases before it,
the likelihood of its being able to communicate the "correct" decision-
making process to lower courts in terms of objectively identifiable stan-
dards seems remote. The theoretical benefits of this "threshold balanc-
ing" approach, therefore, appear to be significantly offset by practical
difficulties. In view of these difficulties, it seems certain that the doc-
trinal addition to the law of equal protection herein described will not
finally solve the problems surrounding delineation of the Court's role
vis-a-vis the other branches of government in the eradication of discrimi-
nation on the basis of wealth or race.
1972]
